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GLENN REYNOLDS,
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vs.

Case No..

AMERICAN FOUNDRY AND MA-

7697

CHINE COMPANY,
Defenda.nt and Appellant

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
GLENN REYNOLDS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts may be accepted with
the following important exceptions and additions:
1. On page 4 of appellant's brief it is stated, uAt the
same time Clarence Silver directed the defendant company to purchase a 6 ton chain block (R 121-122.)" The
3
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actual situation is expressed at R 95, 167 and at the bottom of R 121. Mr. Silver advised Mr. Mattingly, defendant's employer, to get a Yale and Towne chain block that
would lift 6 tons. Mr. Silver knew from his own experience that a Yale and Towne product could be relied upon.
This was his particular recommendation.
2. On page 5 of appellant's brief in the middle of the

page we read, uThe chain block was placed in position
under the direction of Silver and the hand chain operated
in accordance with the usual test made by Silver to see
that the chain block was in functionable condition."
There was no testing nor inspecting for defects in the
chain either by the defendant or Mr. Silver (R 142) .
3. Exception is taken to the following statement of
appellant as found on page 7 of its brief: ((The chain
block was manufactured by the McCollum Hoist and
Chain Company a nationally advertised company whose
products are known under the trade name as indicated;
it being a product known in the same sense in the industry
as a Yale and Towne, Reading and Chrisholm. (301-302,
3 01, 3 51) " This statement has no value unless it is intended to show that the reputation of the McCollum Company for the producing of sound and reliable equipment
is the same as the companies whose names are quoted. The
evidence does not support this proposition. At R 301, 302
Mr. Richeda says that while he is familiar with the names
of companies of competitive products he is not familiar
with the reputation of the products of McCollum Hoist
and Chain Company. Likewise at R 350, 351 Mr. Young
says he used the products of this company twenty years
ago, but he does not know of their general reputation.
4
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4. On pages 8 and 9 of the appellant's brief is a discussion of the lack of custom in the industry to test and
inspect new chain blocks. In every instance that such
testimony was given, it was given over objection and without setting a foundation that makes it material to this
case, namely, the custom of inspecting and testing an
instrumentality that is supplied an invitee workman to be
used for the supplier's business purposes. Since the defendant's liability must rest upon the unusual care incident to
this particular relationship such evidence of custom without such a relationship is without value.
5. On page 8 of the appellant's brief it states that

Mr. Christensen never tested a chain block for his company uthough the testing was the duty assigned to him by
the company." Appellant appears to have _overlooked Mr.
Christensen's testimony at R 250 to the effect that others
in his company had been assigned that particular work.
6. On page 9 of appellant's brief appears the ~ollow
ing: uThe only testing these experts could suggest to determine defects, particularly the latent defect in the link
involved, would be a destructive test resulting in a complete loss of the machinery (R 178, 311) ." Appellant
appears to have overlooked Mr. Christensen's testimony
(R 197, 198, 212, 255) to the effect that a proof test
could have been made and had it been made upon the
particular chain in question, ~he defect in the link that
broke would have been revealed by its breaking. Had there
been no such defect, then twice the rated or safe working
load could have been held by the chain without its destruction. To reach its point of destruction, a load four times
the rated capacity would have had to be applied.
5
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7 · On page 10 of appellant's brief, Mr. Richeda is

quoted to the effect that once a full rated capacity is held
by a chain block for any length of time it is proven and
need not be further inspected. There is other testimony
to the contrary by Mr. Christensen as follows (R 255):

uQ. Now do we understand if you take a brand
new chain and to use it, not at double the_ rate but
at just its rated capacity and use it for a period not
to exceed 50 hours out of a period of 3 weeks that
now you are going to have some kind of examination
made? Have you ever heard of such a practice at
your company or any other company?

uA. I certainly have. As I stated before a chain
block is the most abused piece of machinery that is
probably used."
8. There is no evidence showing the general reputa-

tion for reliability of the products produced by the McCollum Hoist and Chain Company. The evidence is clear,
however, that the chain block in question was produced
by that company and the link broke either because of a
defective weld or because the link was~nealed, or possibly both defects had a bearing on the failure of the link.
It is further clear that had this chain block been subjected
to a proof test, which is not a destructive test; but a test
that all reliable manufacturers give such products, and a
certificate of which test all careful vendees require from
the manufacturer, such a proof test would have broken
the defective link and thus removed such a dangerous
instrument from service.
There is no evidence that the manufacturer made a
proof test or any other kind of test and the evidence is
6
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undisputed that the defendant made no test whatsoever,
nor any kind of inspection.
Appellants contend that the use of the chain block for
48 hours in suspending the dead weight of the core while
infra-red treatments were given was a test. In view of the
evidence as to the purpose of a proof test, the jury was
quite justified in ignoring Mr. Richeda's extravagant statement that such was a test.
9. The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that if

each link of the chain had been carefully inspected for
cracks in the weld, a crack would have been seen in the
weld of the link that broke. Mr. Christensen says that the
crack probably appeared, cc:a considerable time before it
broke." (R 249, 250) Mr. Richeda, defendant's witness,
says the link uhad probably been broken at the time that
the chain was made" (R 316 line 6), and a link by link
inspection of chains is not an uncommon and unheard of
practice (R 248, 310).
It is further undisputed that had the chain been put
to a proof test, the weakness would have been manifested
by breaking. These inspections and testing were never
made either by the manufacturer nor by the defendant.
10. Concerning the relations of the parties, the facts
are these: In December, 1948 Mr. Silver, as an independent

electrical contractor was employed by the defendant to
repair the defendant's transformer. Eleven years prior
thereto Mr. Silver's company installed this transformer for
the defendant. At that time Mr. Silver made a recommendation to the defendant that it acquire and have on
7
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hand in case of an emergency a Yale and Towne Chain
Block that would lift the 6 ton core of the transformer.
The defendant purchased from the McCollum Hoist and
Manufacturing Company through one of its affiliated
companies a 6 ton rated chain block, and for eleven years
this chain block was available on defendant's premises for
the particular purpose of lifting the 6 ton core when necessary. This ;chain block was never used until the break down
of the transformer in December, 1948. When Mr. Silver
commenced the repair work he sent a number of his employees to defendant's place of business to do the work,
among whom was the plaintiff. Since about 200 men
were thrown out of work pending the repair of the transformer, there was a great sense of urgency on the part
of Mr. Silver and the defendant which resulted in a high
degree of co-operation between their respective employees.
For one or two reasons it was mutually decided that the
quickest way to lift the core from the transformer tank
was to bring in a truck hoist instead of using the chain
block, whereupon the defendant immediately employed
and later paid a Mr. Mettome to do this work. It should
here be observed that in the defendant's contract with Mr.
Silver it was in no way contemplated that he should furnish any hoist equipment, and the fact is that the defendant furnished both the truck hoist and the chain block
which was later used. It was while the plaintiff and his
fellow employees were still in the process of repairing
defendant's transformer that defendant's chain block
broke because of a defect in one of the links. These are
facts upon which the evidence shows little, if any, dispute
and they are reiterated here because appellant has based
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

certain arguments on factual premises contrary to those
here stated.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
THERE WAS A DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT
TO TEST AND INSPECT THE CHAIN BLOCK
ACCORDING TO THE BEST TESTS AVAILABLE.
(a) The particular relations of the parties in this case
were su~h as to place a duty in the defendant to test and

inspect the chain block.
(b) Even if the chain block was purchased frmn a

reputable manufacturer (which is not conceded in this
case) it cannot be presumed that the chain block was adequatelJ' inspected and tested by the manufacturer unless
the vendee obtained from the manufacturer a certificate
to the effect that it had been so tested and inspected. Howver, because of the particular relations of the partie~~
this case such a presumption, even if it were justified_, did ·
not relieve the defendant itself from. a duty to adequately
inspect and test.
(c) There need be no evidence of a standard of care

slxnving the necessity of inspection or testing before a chain
block is placed in use when it is purchased new from the
manufacturer, other tha11, the relations of the parties to
the instrumentality, the type of work involved, and the
9
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danger to life and li1nb involved by the use of the instrument if defective. Once these are in evidence· the jury
ma.y then apply the reasonably prudent 1nan doctrine.
(d) To establish his case sufficiently to go to a jury,
it is not necessary in this case for plaintiff to show any
particular practice or custom to inspect or test chain
blocks.

POINT NO. II
ONE SUPPLYING A CHATTEL FOR THE USE
OF ANOTHER AS WAS DONE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE HAS A
DUTY TO DISCOVER LATENT DEFECTS
THEREIN.
POINT NO. III
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN
THE DEFENDANT IN PURCHASING FROM
THE MANUFACTURER THE CHAIN BLOCK
IN THIS CASE AND THE COURT DID NOT
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID
IN INSTRUCTION NO. V.
POINT NO. IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
MR. CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION
AS TO WHETHER THE CHAIN BLOCK
SHO·ULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT
HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A PERIOD OF 48
HOURS.
10
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POINT NO. V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MATTERS MENTIONED IN APPELLANT'S POINTS
NUMBERED V, VI AND VII FOR REASONS
ALREADY DISCUSSED HEREIN.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
THERE WAS A DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT
TO TEST AND INSPECT THE CHAIN BLOCK
ACCORDING TO THE BEST TESTS AVAILABLE.
(a) The particular relatio1zs of the parties in this case

were sttch as to place a duty in the defendant to test and
inspect the chain block.
The relations of the plaintiff and defendant were such
as to place an especially high degree of care in the defendant toward the plaintiff with reference to the safety of the
instrumentality which defendant furnished plaintiff. In
spite of appellant's view to the contrary, respondent at the
time of his injury was engaged in the business of servicing
an instrument for the defendant, on defendant's premises,
at defendant's urgent request, was using an instrumentality
furnished by the defendant, and was using it along with his
fellow employees and employer for the particular purpose
for which it was supplied by the defendant and, at the
time, operated by defendant'semployees as they worked in
11
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co-operation to get the work done for which Mr. Silver
and his employees had been called.
It appears to the respondent that the vital questions
in this case are: What, if any, is the liability of a vendee
of an instrumentality, in which there is a defect from the
time of its manufacture by the vendor, after the vendee
in the furthering of his business interest supplies it to a
third party who is injured as a result of the defect? Does
such a supplier have the same duty of inspecting and testing as the manufacturer under all situations? Or does he
have the same duty under limited situations, or does he
have any duty at all with respect to the instrumentality?
The questions above have arisen very frequently where
the supplier is furnishing elevator service to those who use
the service to transact business in the building which the
elevator serves. This situation is so common and the cases
arising therefrom so numerous, that elevator cases are
treated in legal treatises as a subject by itself which fact
should not blind us to the basic legal questions which are
present regardless of what the particular instrumentality
may be. In these cases the law has placed a duty of a high
degree of ,care upon those who would invite anyone upon
their premises for business purposes and then place at the
invitee's disposal or for his service an instrumentality, especially where the defects, if any, are latent and not readily
observable by the invitee but which could be detected by
the invitor by the best tests available.
In 18 Am Jur. 528, we read:
uThe owner or operator of an elevator is not
excused from the diligence otherwise exacted of him
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the fact that the elevator in question was constructed by a competent and skillful manufacturer,
because the manufacturer is to be considered a mere
agent or servant in its construction, for whose want ~
of care, the owner or operator is responsible. The
obligation of care and foresight rests on the person
who has had the elevator constructed and he cannot
shift it from himself to another. Therefore, if an
innocent person suffers injuries by reason of some
defect in the mechanism, the owner or operator is
generally liable for the injuries, unless the defect
or default was latent and could not have been discovered by a careful examination according to the
best tests reasonably practicable."

It appears, therefore, that the negligence of the manufacturer in the construction of an instrumentality is imputed to anyone who later, as owner, supplies it for the
use of another where the supplier has a pecuniary or business interest. The authors of the above quotation arrive
at this conclusion by suggesting that the producer is an
agent or servant of the supplier in the construction of the
instrumentality. Although this is one way to approach the
problem, the cases generally have developed a theory that
deals directly with a supplier's responsibilities regardless of
how he acquired the instrumentality. In developing a
theory of responsibility for a supplier the courts have not
been concerned as to how the supplier obtained the instrumentality, or how long the defendant has had it, or whether
it has been in use; neither have the courts been concerne-d
whether the supplier has retained control of its operation,
or has placed it in plaintiff's hands as bailee to operate.
These matters are merely incidental to the one controlling
and dominating fact for which they look, viz., whether the

13
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defendant has supplied the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's
employer, with an instrumentality under circumstances
in which not only the plaintiff is being benefited, but also
in which the defendant has a pecuniary or business interest,
and whether the supplier first took whatever steps· were
reasonably necessary to see that the instrumentality was
free from defect and was capable of performing the job
for which it was furnished.
This problem is treated rather exhaustively in 44
A.L.R. 1048 (1926) where under subheading IV is discussed the uLiability of contractee with respect to injuries
resulting from defects in instrumentalities furnished for
the purposes of the stipulated work."
It will be noted from this annotation that the New
York Supreme Court of Appeals in the leading Coughtry
case emphasizes that the plaintiff was injured while employed by the contractor working as an invitee on defendant's premises and scaffolding erected by the defendant,
facts which the court thinks established ( 1) the business
interest of the defendant and (2) the implication that
defendant represents the structure to be safe since it was
supplied by defendant for the express purpose of inducing the men who were to do the work to go upon it. This
principle· is well stated in a recent California case Moran
vs Zenith Oil Co., 206 P2d. 679 (June 7, 1949):

rrwhen the occupant of land knowingly permits a person to enter the premises for the purpose
of performing acts which the workman has been
employed to do, the proprietor is obligated to exercise reasonable care for the protection of the toiler.
14
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He 'lnust supplJ a reasonably safe place in which
the zvork is to be done and n1ust furnish and 1nain.tain such tools and appliances as are necessary and
reasonably safe for use in the operations. A laborer
so enzployed is chargeable u'ith neither a concealed
nor a latent defect in tbe equipment supplied. In
the event he is i11 jured as a result of a latent defect
in the instrunzentalities furnished him of which he
is ignora.nt, be 111 ay recm}er d antages for resulting
injuries, if it is shou./n that the en~ployer, licensor
or proprietor kne1v or by the exercise of reasonable
care should have kno11In of the defect and has failed
to effect a repair thereof or to wprn the workman.
(italics supplied)
1

u

* * * Appellant invited respondent to work

upon its premises and furnished him with its own
instrumentality which proved to be in disrepair.
That the defect was not readily apparent is established by the fact that the faulty cable was subjected to the usual inspection before use, once by
appellant's employee, McGee, in the presence of
the crew foreman and again by the latter's crew on
the day of the accident. When on the latter occasion it was scraped with a knife, shiny steel appeared
beneath the rust. It cannot be said that the rust
covering the cable was itself an indication of imminent peril. Many witnesses testified that all cables
in the area accumulate rust after short exposure
to the elements. Concededly, appellant may not
have known of the dangerous condition of the cable,
but on the facts established it cannot be said that the
jury 1uas arbitrary in finding that by the exercise of
reasonable care appellant could have discovered the
peril and thus have prevented injury to any employee. McGee [ supt. for appellant] testified that
the cable had been hanging in the derrick in excess
of five years and to his knowledge had never been

15
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greased or oiled against the elements or tested for
tensile strength. In addition, there was expert testimony that other operating oil companies serviced
their hanging cables every two or three years to
prevent corrosion and deterioration. Such lack of
diligence to prevent injury to workmen falls below
the high standard of care required in employing
those who are to work under circumstances involving a high risk to personal safety." (italics supplied)
An earlier California case, but still quite recent is
Sheward Et Al vs Bullock's Inc. Et AI (120 P2d 142). The
plain tiff Mrs. Robert Sheward, while sitting in a metal
chair in the beauty parlor of defendant, Bullocks, for the
purpose of receiving a treatment, was precipitated to the
floor when the front right leg of the ~chair was broken.
She sustained serious personal in jury. Among other things
the court said:
((Plaintiffs base their cause of action upon the
alleged negligence of appellants in the manufacturing and assembling of the cast iron chair which the
latter had sold to Bullock's, Inc. some nine months
before plaintiff received her injuries. On receipt of
it, Bullock's carefully inspected the chair and during all of the time the chair was in the beauty parlor,
it underwent tests for its strengtb and soundness.
Bullock's had an employee weighing 250 lbs. to test
the chair twice weekly by riding back and forth
across the floor. He also washed, oiled and inspected
it at the same time. Such care exen~plified the duty
imposed upon the vendee of a n~anufacfttrer. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 396.
If the same degree of care which was used by Bullock's
in testing the chair had been exercised by defendant in the
16
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case now before the court, the weakness in the link would
have been discovered, and we repeat the court's words:
usuch care exemplified the duty imposed upon the vendee
of a manufacturer." In other words the duty of testing
and inspecting by the best means available is definitely
imposed upon the supplier of an instrumentality where
the supplier has a business interest.
The views of Harper on Torts at Section 105 and the
cases and annotations referred to above have been adopted
by the restators of the Law of Torts, Section 392 which is
quoted in appellant's brief at pp 38-39. In commenting on
sub-paragraph 2, Section 392 the restators make this statement:
usection 392 states the rule under which a
peculiar liability is imposed upon one supplying
chattels for another's use because of the fact that
the use is one in which the supplier has a business
interest. A person so supplying goods is required
not only to give warning of dangers which he knows
are involved in the use of the article, or which, from
facts within his knowledge, he knows are likely to
be so involved but also to subject the article to such
an inspection as the danger of using it in a defective
condition makes it reasonable to require. The additional duty of inspection thrown upon the person
so supplying chattels for a use in which he has a
business interest as compared with the absence of
any such duty when he has no business interest in
the use for which the chattel is supplied, is analogous
to the duty of inspection imposed upon one who
permits another to come upon his land for his business purpose and the absence of such duty where the
permission is granted for any other reason.,,

17
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Section 392 together with the restator's comment as
above quoted was cited with approval by the Supreme
Court of Ohio in the case of Hilleary vs Bromley Et AI
(January 1946) 64 NE 2d 835. This case is especially
instructive here because of the facts:
· uln 1940 the defendants ~· * * were partners
::· * * and were engaged in the business of furnishing, selling and applying roll siding on dwelling
houses.
uPrior to April· 6, 1940 they agreed to apply
siding on a dwelling house on Hasack Street in the
City of Columbus. The defendants in turn entered
into a sub-contract with the plaintiff whereby the
latter agreed to apply the siding on the house in
question, and the defendants agreed to furnish the
plaintiff, for such purpose, equipment consisting of
ladders, jacks, and planks.
((Pursuant to such agreement, the defendants
furnished and delivered to the plaintiff, at the site
where the siding was to be applied, the equipment
above mentioned, with the knowledge that the ladders so furnished were expe~cted to bear the weight
of one or two men, the jacks, the planks and sufficient material which might weigh about 75 lbs.,
to cover the surface being worked upon.
uThe plaintiff inspected the ladders each day
he used them but discovered no defects therein.
There was no inspection of the ladders to determine
the weight, stress or strain which they would bear
except by the manufacturer thereof, and the evidence discloses no specific inspection of the ladder
in question by defendants for any purpose. The
ladders were painted by the defendants after they
18
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came into their possession and before they were.
delivered to the plaintiff, which, to some extent~
obscured the grain of the wood.

u.on

April 6, 1940, the fourth day after the
work had been started on this job, the plaintiff
placed three of the ladders against the side of the
house approximately ten feet apart. The jacks were
hooked upon and suspended from the upper rungs
of the ladder and in turn supported two planks
extending between the ladders. While the plaintiff
and a helper were standing on one of these planks,
suspended between an end ladder and the middle
ladder, the inside rail or upright of the end ladder
broke into the third rung and then split at the rung
·down past fourth rung and out between the fourth
and :fifth rungs, with the result that the plank upon
which the plaintiff was standing and the plaintiff
himself were precipitated to the ground, a distance
of about sixteen feet. Plaintiff's foot was severely
injured, resulting in a permanent impairment.
u.A subsequent examination of the ladder rail
indicated that the split followed the grain of the
wood. The defendants claim that the ladders had
been inspected before they were delivered to the
plaintiff, but the record discloses no· evidence of any
particular inspection by any particular person.
u.The plaintiff brought. this action to recover
damages for his injuries alleging in his petition that
they resulted from the negligence of the defendants
in furnishing him a ladder which was defective and
inadequate for the purpose for which it was to be
use d..."·~*"
-· .,
The court upholds the plaintiff's views concerning
liability and gives a well reasoned opinion for so doing. In
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view of its length we shall not quote further from the case
hut urge its careful consideration upon the court.
The principles thus far discussed concerning a supplier's duties toward the users of a chattel which is supplied
in the furtherance of the supplier's business interest are
especially applicable where there is great potential danger
of serious injury and loss of life if the chattel fails in doing
the thing for whi,ch it is supplied. In the case at bar the
chattel which is supplied was furnished to lift and suspend
over a number of workmen a weight of 12,000 pounds of
a relatively bulky mechanism, that is, bulky in relation
to the amount of space left in which the men could work
in the small building which housed the transformer, and
also bulky in relation to the size of the men themselves.
To emphasize the peril of the situation we need only reflect
what would have happened to the men below if the link
had broken a few moments sooner when the core had not
yet started into the container. What chance would the
men below have had to escape being crushed to death?
With reference to the importance of considering the
presence of great danger and its relation to the amount of
care required, our Supreme Court has said in the case of
White vs Pinney, 108P2 249:

uo£ course what constitutes (reasonable care'
or the care that would be exercised by a person of
ordinary prudence may vary with the nature of the
instrumentality employed, that is, the care must be
proportionate to the probability of injury that may
arise to others. For example, in cases where wires
carry a dangerous current of electricity or where
explosives are handled, and the result of negligence
20
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might be death or serious accidents, a greater care
is required because of the danger inherent in the
instrumentality. With such things an a.ct may well
be negligence which would not be such with instrumentalities of less potential danger to others. Where
the danger is great the care exercised must be commensurate with it. The degree of care required in
law is proportionate to the dangers that reasonable
men would apprehend under .the circumstances.
Failure to exercise such degree of care is negligence,,
and negligence is the gravamen of the action."

Even if the chain block was purchased from a
reputable 1nanufacturer (which is not conceded in this
case) it cannot be presumed that the chain block was adequately inspected and tested by the manufacturer unless
the vendee obtained from the manufaclurer a certificate
to the effect that it had been so tested and inspected. However, because of the particular relations of the parties.JJkau
this case such· a presunzption, even if it were justified:J Mi
not relieve the defendant itself from a duty to adequately
inspect a1td test.
(b)

This is

..-MV

a~~-

answer to appellant's Point I (a).

Appellant's general statemen~der this sub-heading
at the bottom of page 12 of this · is neither a correct
statement of fact concerning the manufacturer, nor is
it a correct statement of the law as applied to this case.
As heretofore mentioned under 3 of respondent's exceptions to Appellant's statement of facts there is no evidence
supporting the proposition that the McCollum Hoist and
Manufacturing Company of Downers Grove, Illinois had
the general reputation for producing reliable products. For
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facts showi~g tha~ such a~ttm:ption--~not . ~x::teti
9-y- ~fte. e 'idstlso, see discussion hereafter under Point III.

However, under the particular facts of this case, the
law does not permit the defendant to shift his responsibility
to the manufacturer even if it had purchased a Yale and
Towne chain block, as Mr. Silver requested them to do,
or any other . make regardless of reputation. A leading
case supporting this proposition is Hegeman vs Western
Railroad Corporation 13 NY 9; 64 Am. Dec. 517, ( 18 55) .
In that case plaintiff was uinjured by the car in which he
was sea ted, being wrecked. through a defect in the axel.,.
The court said:
uTwo questions were presented for the consideration of the Jury: ( l) Was there a test known
to and used by others and which should have been
known to a skillful manufacturer, by which the
concealed defect in the axel of the car should have
been detected; and if so, then ( 2) Was the in jury
to the plaintiff ·the consequence of that imperfection? There was evidence tending to establish these
facts, which the jury have found; and the question returns, ~can the defendant, who neither applied the test nor caused it to be applied by the
manufacturer insist that this accident could not
have been avoided by the utmost degree of care and
skill in the preparation of the means of conveyance,'
or ~That they used all precautions, as far as human
care and foresight would go, for the safety of the
plaintiff, as one of their passengers'? It seems to
me that there can be but one answer to the question.
ul t was said that carriers of passengers are not
insurers. This is true. It is also said that they [the
defendants] were not required to become smelters
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of iron or manufacturers of ·cars in the prosecution.
of their business. This also must be conceded. What
the law does require, is that they shall furnish a
sufficient car to secure the safety of their passengers,
by the exercise of the utmost care and skill in its
preparation. They may construct it themselves, or
avail themselves of the services of others; but in
either case, they engage that all that well-directed
skill can do has been done for the accomplishment
of this object. A good reputation upon the part of
the builder is very well in itself, but ought not to
be accepted by the public, or the law as a substitute
for a good vehicle. What is demanded, and what is
undertaken by the corporation, is not merely that
the manufacturer had the requisite capacity but
·that it was skillfully exercised in the particular instance. (Italics supplied) If to this extent they are
not responsible, there is no security for individuals
or the public.
ult is perfectly understood that latent defects

may exist, undiscoverable by the most vigilant
examination, when the fabric is completed, from
which the most serious accidents have and may occur. This is well known, as the evidence in this suit
tended to prove; and the jury have found that a
simple test (that of bending the iron after the
axel was formed and before it was connected with
the wheel) existed by which it could be detected.
This should have been known and applied by men
<professing skill in that particular business.' It was
not known, or if known, was not applied by these
manufacturers. It was not used by the defendant,
nor did they inquire whether it had been used by the
builders. (Italics supplied) They relied upon an
external examination, which they were bound to
know would not, however, faithfully prosecuted,
guard their passengers against the dangers arising
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from concealed defects in the· iron of the axei or
in the manufacture of them. For this omissio~ of
duty, or want of skill, the learned judge held, and
I think correctly, that they were liable."
The annotation at 64 AM. Dec. 525 shows that this doctrine is well established in New York and that the text
book writers adopt it and reject the contrary view held by
Michigan as unsound.
This case is quoted extensively with approval by a
California case, Treadwell vs Whittier ( 18 89) 22 Pac 266.
On page 15 of appellant's brief it states that uno
question was raised in the pleadings as to the fact that
the chain block was purchased from a reliable manufacture·r." Reference to plaintiff's paragraph 6 of his complaint as amended will show the allegation that u:the breaking of said link was a direct and proximate result of the
inadequate, defective and latent construction by the defendant or its agent from whom it obtained said chain

block."
(c) There need be no evide11,ce of a standard of care
showing the necessity of inspection or testing before a chain
block is placed in use when it is purchased new from the
manufacturer, other than the relations of the parties to
the instrumentality, the type of work involved, and the
danger to life and li1nb involved by the use of the instrument if defective. Once these are in evidence the jury
may then a.pply the reasonably prudent n~an doctrine.

This sub-heading is in answer to appellant's Point I

(b).
24
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Appellant's general statement under Point I (b) is
incorrect in that it fails to recognize that the standard of
care is determined by the particular relations of the parties,
the evidence concerning which is ample in this case.
Appellant then quotes from some cases supporting
the idea that the custom of other companies is the test of
due .care. Here again appellant fails to see significance in
the relations of the parties in the case at bar. In each of
the cases cited by appellant there is a master-servant
relationship where custom has had an important bearing
on setting a standard of due care, although even in such
cases custom is only a criteria. In negligence cases other
than master-servant cases Mr. Justice Holmes' statement
in 189 US 468 has been the generally accepted doctrine:
~(What usually is done may be evidence· of what ought to
be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard
of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied
with or not." For an excellent discussion of the subject see
68 ALR 1400. On page 1403 of this annotation where the
annotator is discussing negligence cases generally, there is
cited a Michigan Case under the sub-heading Elevators,
which is very instructive. We quote:
uin 209 Michigan 385, 177 NW 139, where
the death of an elevator passenger had resulted from
a defect in a U-bolt, which bolt had been in use
eighteen years although defective when installed, it
appearing that every ninety days, meanwhile, the
elevator had been inspected in the customary manner by professional inspectors; that (it was not the
practice or custom of elevator inspectors, in making
inspections, to take out bolts of this character for
inspection or examination; that not only was this
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not the· custom, but that such a thing had never
been heard of in practice.' The court held in view
of some expert testimony as to the variability of
metals and the need of inspecting those articles upon
which human life depends, that the customary inspection was not conclusive on the court or jury."
Although appellant's quotations under the sub-heading now under discussion are master-servant cases a care.
'
ful reading of all of each of the cases cited will show additional facts, circumstances, and distinctions from the case
at bar which further prevent them from being good
authority to overcome the results of the trial court in the
case now before the court.
Appellant's citation of the GrandTrunk Railroad Company vs lves on Page 19 of its brief is also quoted on page
1402 of the article in 68 ALR referred to above. When
one reads the balance of the sentence quoted in appellant's
brief, together with the entire opinion of the court, one
can well understand why the annotator at p 1402 says: celt
is questionable whether the fact of the mere custom of
railroads as to warnings at street crossings was actually the
point under consideration, or adopted by the court as the
standard." The annotator observes that if mere custom
was the point under consideration, then it is inconsistent
with later rulings of the Supreme Court.
On pp 23-25 of appellant's brief, there is quoted some
testimony of Don Rosenblatt to the effect that it would
be necessary to destroy link if it were to be tested as to its
being annealed. And on pp 25-26 Mr. Christensen's testimony is quoted to the effect that a new chain block-any

a
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new chain block-could be given a proof test without re~
vealing necessarily an unannealed link. We have no argument with this, nor need we be concerned with it. Respondent is not required to show that the defect was an unannealed link. All he had to show was that there was a
defect-any kind of defect-in the link and that the
defect would have been revealed by a test known to the
industry. And Mr. Christensen testified that a proof .test
would have revealed the defect by breaking the defective
link. (R 211, 212)
The remainder of appellant's argument under Point
II (b) is based on the premise that the standard of care was
the same as the custom elsewhere. The discussion above
has attempted to show that ( 1) There is no evidence showing any custom of parties in a similar relation as plaintiff
and defendant herein, and ( 2) even if there were such
evidence, it would not be controlling, but only influential
on the jury.

To establish his case sufficiently to go to a jury,
it is not necessary in this case for plaintiff to show any
particular practice or custom to inspect or test chain blocks.
(d)

(c)

This point is in answer to appellant's Point I ~.
Appellant appears to find fault with plaintiff for
changing theories during the trial. If it is censurable to
learn of facts during the trial, of which plaintiff and his
counsel were not aware prior thereto, then appellant is
justified in this attack. Neither the plaintiff nor his counsel
knew that the defect was in the weld until after the conference in Judge Van Cott's chambers. This meeting. with
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Judge VanCott did leave plaintiff's counsel with the definite impression that as long as the defect appeared to be
latent he was not going to permit the case to go to the
jury· The judge's views, we believed, were in error in
view of the cases cited herein, but we realized our case
would be prejudiced at that stage of the proceedings unless
the defect could be shown to be one observable by the
unaided eye. With this thought in mind Mr. Wilkinson
took the link and the section that had been cut from it,
to Mr. Christensen and asked him to look at them-and it
was the first time he had had such an opportunity-to see
if there was anything about the link that would indicate
a defect other than the defect of excessive brittleness or
lack of annealing. After examining both pieces he unequivocally said that the break was not from the lack of
annealing but from a defective weld. This was a surprise
to us, but one which we came to welcome, because of
Judge Van Cott's restricted view of defendant's duties.
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Richeda thereafter both testified
that a defect in the weld very probably would have been
observed by inspection before the break. (R 246-251,
315, 316)
Appellant's· counsel bring this matter up, they say,
so that the court umay properly appraise the testimony of
Mr. Christensen and to appraise the shift in position of
Plaintiff during the trial." We welcome the court's appraisal of these facts. The trial judge and jury took due
note of it also. But we hasten to emphasize that the basic
facts and theories of this case were not changed by this
new information.. On the contrary, it gave emphasis to
them, namely, that there was a defect not only observable
28
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by a known test to which the chain block could and should
have been put, but also a defect which could have been
found by a link by link inspection.
Appellant says that the holding of the dead weight of
the transformer core for 48 hours was a sufficient test to
relieve defendant from its duty to test. It has already been
shown, however, that the industry considers a proof test
one which subjects the chain to twice its rated capacity
and a destructive test one which submits the chain to four
times its rated capacity. Can it be possible that appellant
actually believes that where the risk of human life and limb
is involved we can accept as a test of this instrument's
capacity the lifting and holding for 48 hours the exact
weight at which it is rated without taking any particular
stress during that time? Do they actually argue that where
the risk of human life and limb is involved there should
be no effort to determine to some extent whether there is a
margin of safety to protect against unusual stresses and
strains as the chain moves over the wheel or strains from
other causes? Do they argue that this is a test at all?
It may be that an employee in an employee-employer
relationship is accustomed to take a -risk with instruments
furnished by his employer and by that custom he may learn
to make due allowance for defects and so act accordingly.
But where plaintiff is a business invitee of defendant and
defendant furnishes him an instrumentality to do the
work which he has been called to do by the defendant and
the work is of such a nature that the instrument must be
sound or lives and limbs may be risked, then that plaintiff
is entitled under the law to a protection considerably greater than the utest," so called, that the appellant advocates.
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POINT NO. II
ONE SUPPLYING A CHATTEL FOR THE USE
OF ANOTHER AS WAS DONE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF. THIS CASE HAS A DUTY
TO DISCOVER LATENT DEFECTS THEREIN.
This point is in a~swer to appellant's Point No. II.
When Appellant says that the chain block was furnished plaintiff as a gratuity and not in furtherance of a
business interest, it appears to base such a conclusion on
( 1) the supposition that ((The Silver Company employed
a hoist operated by a truck to lift the transformer out of
the metal container both during the period of the initial
repair and during the first lifting of the lengthy remodeling and repair which followed," and ( 2) the- supposition
that because Mr. Silver used the instrument that was acquired and supplied by the defendant for this purpose
that it was a gratuity, and therefore the defendant had no
business interest therein.
The first supposition above is directly contradictory
to the undisputed evidence of Mr. Silver at R 100 wherein
it is stated that the defendant employed and ·paid for Mr.
Mettome's service to do the first hoist work. Mr. Silver
did not employ Mr. Mettome. (see also R 138).
The second assumption above indicates a misunderstanding of what constitutes a business interest of the defendant and rather than labor what to us appears obvious
and wh~t has heretofore been dis:cussed we shall submit it.
30
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POINT NO. III
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN
THE DEFENDANT IN PURCHASING FROM
THE MANUFACTURER THE CHAIN BLOCK
IN THIS CASE, AND THE COURT DID NOT
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID
IN INSTRUCTION NUMBER IV.
This point is in answer to appellant's Point No. III.
Cases have already been cited and quoted herein on
the questions raised under this sub-heading of appellant's
argument. It has also been noted herein that plaintiff included in his complaint (Paragraph 6 as amended) this
matter of negligence in the defendant in the acquiring of
the chain block. Appellant says further that uthe record
is absolutely barren of any evidence to support such a
claim if it had been made. ::· * ::· The jury could not infer
from any fact presented to it or any issue properly before it that the supplier of the chain block to the defendant
was not of the most satisfactory reputation and the highest integrity."
In answer to the above we submit the following facts
from which the jury could make such an inference:
1. The chain block, while in new condition, broke

with a load exactly equal to its rated capacity.
2. Mr. Christensen's testimony as found at R 213
beginning on line 3 8 and reading to R 215 line 21 to the

effect that because of the size of the chain and the kind
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of metal used, uthe manufacturer overrated the chain
-very considerably."
3. Neither Mr. Christensen, nor Mr. Silver, both of

whom had used and been around chain blocks for many
years knew or had heard of the McCollum Chain and
Manufacturing Company prior to their experience with
the chain block in question. (R 172, 167, 301-302) Nor
did Mr. Young know of its reputation. (R 350}
4. The weld was defective.
5. The link was unannealed.
6. The chain was never submitted to a proof test.
There is little, if any, doubt that such a test would be
given by a reputable company in view of plaintiff's exhibit
A. The following is taken from page 568 of said exhibit:

UPROOF TESTS
6 (a) All chains shall be proof tested by· subjecting

it to the proof test load prescribed in Table I for the respective size chain, and when so tested it shall stand these
loads without showing any defects.
(b) When requested the manufacturer shall furnish a certificate of proof test to the purchaser or his repre. ''
sentattve.
In connection with the above, Mr. Christensen testified, as has already been noted, that had this particular
chain been put to a proof test, it would have broken (R
32
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211 line 2 6, to R 212 line 7) . It is further observed that

the defendant did not produce any evidence of having acquired from the manufacturer a certificate that the chain
block had been proof tested.
Reference is made to Mr. Christensen's testimony
(R 195) concerning plaintiff's Exhibit A from which I
quote: uThe publications of this society are regarded as of
the highest class and as recommendations for methods of
testing and care of machinery of this type."

POINT NO. IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
MR. CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION
AS TO WHETHER THE CHAIN BLO-CK
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT
HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A PERIOD OF 48
HOURS.
This point is in answer to

appellant~s

Point IV.

The question which appellant claims is in error is
found at the top of page 45 of appellant's brief. The objection by appellant to the question prior thereto which
appellant quotes on page 44 of its brief was sustained. The
question under consideration then is: uln your opinion,
should this have been inspected after it had been used for
a period of 48 hours holding a weight of 6 tons~
Appellant's objections to this question are as follows:
I. That Mr. Christensen was not an expert in this field,
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because uthe testing of chains as such was not part of his
job" as a metallurgist,
2. That an expert may not testify as to probabilities,
3. That there were no facts in evidence upon which

to base such a question,
4. ·That the question was phrased improperly and,
5. Their objection expressed on page 46 in the last

paragraph under Point No. IV but which is not sufficiently
clear to us for us either to admit or deny.
Obje.ction 1 is without merit because although Mr.
Christensen does not test chains as such he has tested welds
and mate~ials exactly similar to a chain (R 250). Furthermore his education and long experience in the field of
metallurgy eminently qualify him as an expert concerning
the properties of metals generally. (R 193, 194)
As to Objection 2 we submit that experts may testify
as to probabilities.
Concerning Objection 3 there is evidence to the effect
that the core was 6 tons in weight, all of which was suspended by the chain block 48 hours shortly prior to the
occasion when the link broke ( R 10 3, 1 51 ) .

If there is any merit to appellant's Obje.ctions 4 and
5 above they certainly did not prejudice the appellant's
case in view of Mr. Christensen's answer, the court's instructions to the jury, and all the other evidence upon
which the jury could soundly base its verdict.
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POINT NO. V
THE ~OURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MATTERS
MENTIONED IN APPELLANT'S POINTS NUMBERED V, VI AND VII FOR REASONS ALREADY DISCUSSED HEREIN.

CONCLUSION
This court should enter its order affirming the judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

WILKINSON & SMOOT
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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